The structure of employment is always changing and economists are always trying to understand those changes. In the 1990s the idea of skill-biased technological change (SBTC) was used to understand the shift in employment towards more-educated workers (see David H. Autor and Lawrence F. Katz, 1999 , for a survey). However, in recent years, it has become apparent that a more nuanced approach is needed. The idea of SBTC might lead one to predict a uniform shift in employment away from low-skilled and towards high-skilled occupations but studies for the US (Autor, Katz and Melissa S. Kearney, 2006) and the UK (Goos and Manning, 2007) have shown that there is growth in employment in both the highest-skilled (professional and managerial) and lowest-skilled occupations (personal services), with declining employment in the middle of the distribution (manufacturing and routine office jobs). This is what Goos and Manning (2007) term job polarization -although see the introduction to Goos and Manning (2007) for antecedents of these ideas.
There are several hypotheses about the reasons for job polarization. First, the 'routinization' hypothesis (first put forward by Autor, Frank Levy and Richard Murnane, 2003) suggests that the effect of technological progress is to replace 'routine' labor which tends to be clerical and craft jobs in the middle of the wage distribution. Second, there is the view that globalization in general and offshoring in particular is an important source of change in the job structure in the richest countries (see, for example, Alan S. Blinder, 2007) .
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of income going to the rich in the US and the UK may have led to an increase in demand for low-skill workers whose employment increasingly consists of providing services to the rich (Manning, 2004; Francesca Mazzolari and Giuseppe Ragusa, 2007 3 To see which occupations are growing in importance and which are declining, Table 1 ranks occupations from highest-paid to lowest-paid and reports the percentage-point change in the employment share between 1993 and 2006 for each occupation. Among the fastest growing occupations we find many high-paid jobs such as professionals and managers but also several of the lowest-paid occupations such as personal service, transport and sales workers. The largest relative declines are observed for craft workers, machine operators and office clerks. European countries in our sample. The employment share of the lowest-paying occupations increases relative to the employment share of the middling occupations in all countries except Italy, while the employment share of the highest-paying occupations increases relative to the employment share of the middling occupations in all countries except Portugal. On average, the low-and high-paying occupations increase their employment shares by 6 and 2 percentage-points (or 9 and 22 percent), respectively, whereas the middling occupations decrease their employment share by 8 percentage-points (or 17 percent). 
II. Changes in the Demand for Tasks and Offshoring
The introduction discussed skill-biased technical change, routinization, offshoring and wage inequality as potential explanations of changes in the occupational structure of employment. To capture the ideas behind skill-biased technical change we use the average level of education in an occupation. To capture the 'routinization' hypothesis we use 96
variables from the US Occupational Information Network (ONET) database to construct three measures of the types of tasks contained in an occupation -Abstract tasks, which are intense in non-routine cognitive skills; Service tasks, intense in non-routine non-cognitive skills; and Routine tasks, intense in both cognitive and non-cognitive routine skills. Goos, Manning and Salomons (2008) contains more details on the way in which these variables are constructed. Abstract tasks are concentrated in high-paid service jobs, Routine tasks in middling jobs and Service tasks in low-paid service jobs so that our measures do seem to capture the essence of the routinization hypothesis.
To capture to what extent the tasks done in different occupations are offshorable, we use counts of news reports about offshoring of European jobs from the European
Restructuring Monitor (again, see Goos, Manning and Salomons, 2008 , for more details).
Routine jobs (e.g. machine operators, office clerks) are offshored most often, although some non-routine occupations (e.g. engineering professionals, customer service clerks) are still much more offshorable than others (e.g. drivers, personal service workers, health professionals).
Finally, we use wage data for each of the countries from the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP), the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and the OECD to compute time-varying measures of occupational wages and measures of wage inequality. We might expect that countries with compressed occupational wage distributions have a relatively small share of employment in low-wage occupations because relative wages affect factor prices but also because inequality in general has a positive effect on the demand for low-skill workers through the demand for personal services of the rich. It is a common belief that wage compression in many European countries is associated both with low general levels of employment and with a distinctive structure of employment (see, for example, Richard Rogerson, 2008 , who considers the industrial dimension). However, the evidence in Figure 2 does not suggest a strong cross-sectional link between wage inequality and the structure of employment. Overall wage inequality (log(p90/p10), the log ratio of the ninetieth to the fiftieth percentile of the wage distribution)
is not significantly positively correlated with the share of employment in the four lowestpaying occupations. This result is insensitive to using different measures of wage inequality (log(p50/p10) or log(p90/p50)); to the period over which wage inequality is measured; to using the share of low-wage employment in a year different from 1993; and to excluding outliers. Of course, even finding a positive relationship would not necessarily prove causality runs from wage inequality to low-wage employment -if a country for some reason has a high share of employment in low-wage occupations then this may tend to raise wage inequality.
Yet there may be other reasons why countries differ in their share of low-wage
employment. An alternative approach to investigating this is to see whether there is a relationship between changes in wage inequality and changes in the structure of employment -and our regressions investigate this. To test the different hypotheses about the causes of job polarization, the first column of Table 3 includes variables related to all of the factors considered above. These are, with the exception of the wage variable, interacted with a time trend to model the idea of a process.
The evidence is strongest for the routinization hypothesis although the signs of all variables except 'education' are in line with predictions (education has the sign predicted by SBTC if one excludes the task-content variables). The second column retains only those variables found to be significant.
(1) The specifications of Table 3 assume that the effects of technological change are the same for all countries. To test whether the time trends estimated in Table 3 are pervasive across countries, we interact the variables in Table 3 with country dummies and test for their joint significance (not reported here). The F-test for country heterogeneity in Abstract employment growth has a p-value of 0.24; in Routine employment growth a p-value of 0.97; and in Service employment growth a p-value of 0.59. Given the pervasiveness of job polarization shown in Table 2 , this is in line with the routinization hypothesis. To the contrary, the decrease in employment growth for offshorable occupations does seem to be less pervasive and hence more country specific with a p-value of 0.11.
III. Conclusions
Since the early 1990s Europe, like the US and UK, has experienced job polarization, that is, a disproportionate increase in high-paid and low-paid employment. Pervasive job polarization is in line with the evidence that in advanced countries, technologies are becoming more intense in the use of non-routine tasks concentrated in high-paid and lowpaid service jobs at the expense of routine tasks concentrated in manufacturing and clerical work. The evidence for alternative explanations -offshoring and inequality -is much weaker.
